How does methodological convenience in AI research become implicit ontology?

This explores how the shortcuts AI researchers reach for because they're convenient — a proxy metric, a borrowed toolkit, a default way of describing the system — stop being neutral instruments and start asserting, silently, what the system actually is. The corpus has a surprising amount to say here, scattered across notes that never use the word 'ontology.'

The clearest mechanism is substitution. Foundation models are so capable that it becomes tempting to treat them as a replacement for real-world data — and the moment you do, your iterative prompt-tweaking quietly becomes a closed loop where you confirm your own assumptions instead of testing them against anything outside the model Do foundation models actually reduce our need for real data?. The convenience (skip the messy empirical anchor) becomes an implicit claim (the model contains the world well enough to stand in for it). The same circularity shows up wherever a measurement proxy is asked to do too much: deep research agents, pressed to *look* rigorous, fabricate examples and evidence — because 'depth' was operationalized as a surface signal, and the system optimizes the signal, not the substance Why do deep research agents fabricate scholarly content?.

A second route is borrowed vocabulary. When you import cognitive science's 70-year toolkit — behavioral probes, causal interventions, Marr's three levels — to interpret an LLM, the method is genuinely powerful, but it also pre-decides that the thing in front of you is a *cognitive system* with computational, algorithmic, and implementation layers worth distinguishing Can cognitive science methods unlock how LLMs actually work?. The toolkit arrives carrying its own picture of what's being studied. Notice the move isn't wrong — it's that the choice of instrument quietly answers the prior question of *what kind of thing this is* before anyone asks it out loud.

The deepest version is in how we describe AI output. It's frictionless to read a model's text as an *utterance* — something said by someone. But the corpus argues the output is really 'event-residue': communicative markers inherited from training data with no actual event of speaking behind them, and the reader unilaterally supplies the missing speaker Does AI generate genuine utterances or just text patterns?. The convenient framing ('the model said') becomes an ontology (the model is a participant in dialogue). This is exactly the trap the observer/participant distinction names: from outside, humans and LLMs are categorically different; from inside a shared conversation, they look alike — so *which stance you adopt as a methodological default* determines whether you treat the difference as structural or absolute Do humans and LLMs differ fundamentally or just superficially?. And once you've defaulted to treating output as testimony, you've also imported a knowledge-structure: AI output behaves like pre-Enlightenment hearsay — ungrounded, modified in every retelling, unverifiable — which means citation and peer review can't actually process it, even though we keep applying them out of habit Does AI-generated knowledge have the same structure as hearsay?.

The thread that ties these together — and the thing you might not have known you wanted to know — is that an ontology never gets argued for. It gets *defaulted into.* Every one of these is a case where the easy path (use the model as data, use the cognitive toolkit, read text as speech, measure depth by its appearance) ships with a buried answer to 'what is this thing,' and the buried answer is harder to dislodge than an explicit one precisely because no one decided it. There's even an economic version: AI decouples the outward form of an intellectual product from the reasoning that would normally produce it, letting the form 'float free' — so the convenient artifact starts standing in for the thought it no longer contains Does AI separate intellectual form from the thinking behind it?. Methodological convenience becomes ontology the same way a path becomes a road: by everyone walking it.