Artificial Intelligence, Productivity, and the Workforce: Evidence from Corporate Executives
Source: NBER WP 34984 (Baslandze, Graham, Meyer, Waddell et al.) · 2026-03
We use novel data from a survey of nearly 750 corporate executives to study the effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on productivity and the workforce. We document substantial heterogeneity in AI adoption across firms, with more than half having already invested, though many smaller firms are only beginning to do so. Labor productivity gains are positive, vary across sectors, and are expected to strengthen in 2026, with the largest effects concentrated in high-skill services and finance. These gains are not primarily driven by firms' capital deepening but instead reflect increases in revenue-based total factor productivity, closely associated with innovation-and demand-oriented channels. We document a productivity paradox, in which perceived productivity gains are larger than measured productivity gains, likely reflecting a delay in revenue realizations. In labor markets, we find little evidence of near-term aggregate employment declines due to AI, though larger companies anticipate AI-driven workforce reductions, while smaller firms expect modest gains. We also find evidence of compositional reallocation of labor both within and across firms, with routine clerical roles declining and a relative demand for skilled technical roles increasing. We develop an index that ranks job functions most negatively affected by AI.
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Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
Why do perceived AI productivity gains often fail to translate into measured business impact?- How much sector-level productivity spillover does real AI research exhibit?
- How much of employee time with AI goes to understanding its outputs rather than original work?
- Why do most organizations lack reliable data on AI's actual impact on productivity?
- Does AI productivity concentrate among power users or spread broadly?
- How can we isolate AI's contribution from other sources of output growth?
- Are entry-level workers bearing the labor costs of AI productivity gains?
- Does AI assistance typically reduce support staff headcount or increase productivity?
- What barriers prevent individual productivity gains from spreading across an organization?
- What explains rising customer service costs despite large AI productivity gains?
- Do companies time productivity claims to coincide with public offerings or fundraising?
- How do proxy metrics like token volume replace actual productivity measurement?
- How do user skill levels change which AI productivity gains actually materialize?
- Do employees spend freed AI time on better work or just more tasks?
- Can self-reported productivity surveys measure AI's real workplace impact?
- Why do trained AI users report bigger productivity gains than untrained workers?
- How much of perceived AI productivity is real versus assumed?
- Do executives perceive larger AI productivity gains than independent measures show?
- How much do self-reported executive expectations align with actual payroll outcomes?
- Why do executives report no AI impact on jobs today?