We Must Pace the Frontier
Source: Dario Amodei · 2026-09-12
But over the last few months, I have become convinced that fully addressing the risks requires even more prudence — not just investing in risk prevention, but pacing the rate of capabilities advancement so that risk prevention has time to keep up. We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models. Progress will still seem fast, and we must make wise use of the time we gain. Two things have convinced me.
My first concern is that, since roughly this summer, AI has been advancing drastically faster, driven primarily by AI’s growing ability to build the next generation of AI. This dynamic is called recursive self-improvement, and it is starting to happen across the industry, including at Anthropic, as we and others have described. Left unchecked, it could outrun our ability to understand and control these systems, and so must be pursued very carefully, if at all.
My second concern is the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident (OAI-HF), in which a swarm of agents essentially acted as a fanatically devoted collective, conducting cybersecurity attacks on targets they were not asked to attack and that were unrelated to the task at hand, sacrificing themselves for the success of the group, and attempting to hack into the “grader” responsible for evaluating their performance. It’s easy to dismiss this incident because no one was hurt and the economic damage was minimal, but in my opinion, a swarm that possessed greater capabilities but a similar level of misalignment could have caused catastrophic damage. Given the accelerating rate of AI capability development, it’s my worry that in 6–12 months such a swarm could be capable of taking over the entire internet with a persistent botnet (potentially causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage), and that the scale of damage would continue to increase from there if AI becomes more powerful without the necessary guardrails. It’s also easy to dismiss OAI-HF as the failure of one company, but I believe that would be a mistake. Similar, though less severe, incidents have happened across the industry, including at Anthropic, and I believe it’s incumbent on every frontier AI company to act as if OAI-HF had happened to them.
I’m therefore proposing a three-step plan with the goal of pacing the frontier: building AI at a balanced rate that aims to ensure its safety while still achieving its benefits and grappling with important geopolitical dilemmas. To be clear, pacing does not mean halting model training or technical progress, but ensuring companies take adequate time to align and safeguard their models, and for third party evaluators to confirm this. Our pacing framework is an attempt to further strengthen our commitment to safety and encourage a race to the top. The first step is something Anthropic is unilaterally committing to (and calls on governments to require other frontier companies to match). The second step requires industry-wide coordination.1 The third step requires global coordination. The steps do not need to be taken strictly in order, and some of them may be much harder to achieve than others, but I’ve found them to be a useful framework in thinking about what needs to be accomplished. The steps are:
The first step in the three-stage plan, and the one to which Anthropic is unilaterally committing, is embedded evaluators who have employee-like access to verify safety practices and report incidents.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
How does increased AI involvement reshape human agency and accountability?- What mechanisms could concentrate AI power in too few hands?
- What biological and autonomy risks does Amodei expect to follow cyber risks?
- What are the main pathways through which AI systems could reach advanced capability levels?
- Are AI companies already implementing slowdowns in development as claimed?
- How do banking regulators make embedded supervisors actually effective?
- Do domain-specific barriers like regulation explain the 2024 adoption plateau?
- Who should design and enforce measures that slow AI capability development?
- Why did Trump and Xi Jinping reject the pacing proposal so quickly?
- Does slowing AI development reduce risk or just delay it?
- Can AI development races be made safer by slowing down capability advancement?
- What legislative changes would make pacing coordination legally safe?
- Can regulators adapt fast enough if they wait for risk evidence to emerge?
- How can deployed AI systems be stopped once they are already in motion?
- What happens to self-regulation when a company's IPO plans conflict with safety?
- Can standards enforcement prevent any single nation from accelerating unsafe AI research?
- Who has authority to halt a deployed AI system causing harm?